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Endemic circulation of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Africa and Asia poses a
continuous risk to countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania which are free from
the disease. Introductions of the disease into a free region have dramatic economic
impacts, especially if they are not detected at an early stage and controlled rapidly.
However, farmers and veterinarians have an obvious disincentive to report clinical signs
that are consistent with FMD, due to the severe consequences of raising an official
suspicion, such as farm-level quarantine. One way that the risk of late detection can
be mitigated is offering non-discriminatory exclusion testing schemes for differential
diagnostics, wherein veterinarians can submit samples without the involvement of the
competent authority and without sanctions or costs for the farmer. This review considers
the benefits and limitations of this approach to improve the early detection of FMD in free
countries and gives an overview of the FMD testing schemes currently in use in selected
countries in Europe and the Americas as well as in Australia.
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INTRODUCTION
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious vesicular disease of cloven-hoofed animals
caused by an aphthovirus in the family Picornaviridae. The main clinical signs of FMD are lesions
on the tongue, oral mucosa and nasal planum, on the teats and in the interdigital spaces and
coronary bands of the feet. Except in very young stock, mortality is generally low, but the reduced
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productivity and the loss of draft power cause significant
economic hardship and food insecurity in endemic areas, which
are exacerbated by the costs of control measures, and the
forfeiture of trade revenue (1).
FMDV has not occurred in Europe, North America and
Oceania for almost 10 years; the last FMD outbreak in any
of these regions was in Bulgaria during 2011 (2), while North
America and Oceania have been free for much longer. FMD was
eradicated in Australia, the United States, Canada and Mexico in
1872, 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively (3), and has never been
reported fromNew Zealand. However, it is still endemic in Africa
and Asia (see also the map in Figure 1) (4), and there is always a
serious risk of the virus being reintroduced, particularly through
the illegal import of animal products. Introductions of FMD
into free regions have dramatic social and economic impacts,
especially if they are not detected and controlled rapidly (1).
THE CASE FOR NON-DISCRIMINATORY
FMD EXCLUSION TESTING
It has often been argued by proponents of pen-side testing
that the time from sample submission to the return of results
from the diagnostic laboratory is a significant obstacle to the
rapid detection of an FMD incursion (5, 6). While this may be
the case in areas with insufficient transportation and laboratory
infrastructure, the turnaround time in countries with highly
industrialized agriculture and sophisticated veterinary services is
typically short. For “hot” initial suspicions, samples are sent to
official laboratories by courier or government vehicle and tested
FIGURE 1 | FMD status map of the World Reference Laboratory for FMD (4).
immediately upon arrival, with results usually returned within
24 h (7–9).
By contrast, much longer periods of time can pass between
infection, the first occurrence of clinical signs, their recognition
by the farmer, and finally the submission of samples for
laboratory testing. The first obstacle here is the recognition of
clinical signs and the realization that they may be an indication of
a larger issue that requires veterinary attention (see Figure 2A).
The severity and within-herd prevalence as well as the risk of
onward transmission are related to the time that has elapsed since
the introduction of FMDV into the herd. Therefore, it is essential
that reporting occurs as early as possible, even at a mild incipient
suspicion of disease, rather than waiting for a high level of
morbidity. These factors are critical elements for limiting the size
of outbreaks after a disease incursion into an FMD-free country.
Laboratory testing will not occur unless a problem is reported to
an official or private veterinarian in the first place. Accordingly,
efforts to improve reporting by livestock owners (e.g., awareness
programs, streamlined reporting procedures, or the availability of
telephone “hotlines”) should be considered. But, even if farmers
come to realize that there is a problem, some may decide not
to consult a veterinarian because of cost implications, a lack of
trust in animal health authorities, or the fear of consequences for
themselves or their animals (10–13).
An example of this is the large series of FMD outbreaks that
originated in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2001 and ultimately
affected four countries in Europe, resulting in the culling of over
6 million animals as well as economic losses of 8 billion Euros (1).
After the country had been free of FMD for 34 years, a serotype
O strain of ultimately unknown, but most likely East Asian origin
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FIGURE 2 | Potential roles of farmers (A), as well as veterinary practitioners and official veterinarians (B), in FMD reporting.
was introduced into a pig fattening unit in northern England
by illegal feeding of untreated catering waste (14). This was not
realized until weeks later, when clinical signs were detected in
pigs that became infected at an abattoir that had received animals
from the index herd. At this point, the disease had already spread
widely, and it took over 6 months to bring the outbreak under
control (15). Sheep played a large role in the early dissemination
of the virus, and it was later determined that sheep farmers
had also noticed lameness in their animals but did not seek
veterinary advice (15). While the pig farmer was found guilty of
deliberately hiding the disease in his animals (16), it appears that
the sheep farmers were genuinely unaware of the implications of
their observations.
In areas where a particular disease has not occurred in
decades, most farmers and practitioners are unfamiliar with
its clinical manifestations (11). There are a wide variety of
conditions (both infectious and non-infectious) that can cause
clinical signs that are similar to those of FMD (e.g., oral and/or
pedal lesions or lameness) (17), and particularly in countries
with routine outbreaks of clinically indistinguishable vesicular
diseases, there can be a tendency to think that observed signs
are caused by anything but FMD (11). For example, the only
outbreak of FMD in Canada in 1951 was initially misdiagnosed
as vesicular stomatitis, and samples for laboratory diagnosis were
first submitted almost 3 months after the first observation of
clinical signs (18). Increased incidence of porcine dermatitis and
nephropathy syndrome (PDNS) in the UK likely contributed
to the delayed detection of classical swine fever (CSF) in 2000.
After a false diagnosis of PDNS had been made in one of the
holdings first affected, CSF was not suspected for a further 2
weeks, until losses had accelerated steeply (19). In a more recent
example from Germany, it took more than 3 months until a
highly virulent strain of bovine viral diarrhea virus was identified
as the cause of severe disease in several cattle holdings (20). From
the beginning of the outbreak, clinical signs noted by farmers—
and veterinarians—on the affected premises had included fever
and tongue lesions, but at no point were these animals tested
for FMD.
In cases where FMD cannot be ruled out based on the
clinical picture alone, samples must be submitted for laboratory
examination. However, if the collection and examination of these
samples is contingent on the declaration of a formal suspicion
of FMD, this can set the bar for a submission very high.
Except in the most obvious cases, some veterinary practitioners
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TABLE 1 | Benefits, limitations, and risks associated with non-discriminatory exclusion testing schemes for FMD.
Benefits Limitations and Challenges Risks
−Allows veterinary practitioners to consider
FMD as a differential diagnosis without fear of
negative consequences for the farmer or
themselves
−Testing of low-risk exclusion samples at
regional laboratories creates and maintains
surge capacity for outbreak response
−Requires outreach to farmers and veterinarians to promote
participation
−Farmers still need to notice clinical signs and seek veterinary
attention first
−Requires clear definition of exclusion cases vs. notifiable
suspicions
−Veterinary services must be kept informed and quickly consulted
if problems arise during exclusion testing
−If exclusion testing is used instead of
immediate notification in serious cases, an
appropriate outbreak response may be delayed
−False-negative results can delay the
recognition of an FMD incursion
−May not be acceptable to trading partners
may be reluctant to raise an FMD suspicion because of the
consequences that are precipitated by its formal declaration,
regardless of whether the suspicion is eventually confirmed by
laboratory diagnosis (see also Table 1). In the European Union
(EU), national animal health laws reflect the provisions of articles
4–9 of the “FMD Directive” 2003/85/EC, requiring a quarantine
of the suspect holding and other holdings around it, a movement
ban for all animals in a large area around the suspect holding,
and even the preemptive killing of animals of susceptible species
if this is deemed necessary by the competent authority (21).
Similar regulations are in place in other FMD-free countries
(9, 22, 23).
Unsurprisingly, official veterinarians may be viewed by
practitioners and farmers in an adversarial role. Even though
they are required to do so by law in most jurisdictions,
practitioners can be reluctant to report diseases that could
result in regulatory action and may be afraid of alienating
their clients if they raise suspicions that turn out to be
false alarms (24) (see also Table 1). This is not entirely
unreasonable, because the prior probability of FMD being
the cause of suspicious lesions is very low in areas that
are free of the disease (15). Nevertheless, if the reporting of
suspected foreign animal diseases is only the very last resort,
it creates a serious obstacle for their timely detection and
control (25).
Notwithstanding the critical importance of implementing
rapid control measures in the event of a credible disease
suspicion, a possible approach to increase FMD surveillance
is to allow veterinary practitioners to submit samples for an
exclusion of FMD without restrictions for the farm (with or
without the direct involvement of the competent authority; see
Figure 2B). The laboratory costs for such non-discriminatory
exclusion testing should be covered by communal animal health
funds or the government, because increased testing helps to
protect the entire agricultural sector from disaster, and there
should not be any financial barriers to participation for individual
farmers (11, 24). In addition to excluding FMDV infection,
possible differential diagnoses (both endemic and exotic) can be
covered by the laboratory investigation, ideally at no additional
charge. This added value will further encourage farmers and
their veterinarians to participate in the exclusion testing system
(see also Table 1). Official testing for notifiable diseases such
as FMD is often unsatisfactory for farmers because it does not
return a useful diagnostic result once the target diseases have been
ruled out.
Where non-discriminatory exclusion testing schemes for
FMD are already available (e.g., Switzerland and Germany) (8,
26), educating and encouraging practitioners tomake use of these
programs is an important part of community outreach activities
of the veterinary services (see also Table 1). In addition to the
classical signs of FMD, exclusion testing can also be warranted
for non-specific health problems in a herd. For example, German
animal health law has recently been revised to require cattle
farmers who observe an increased incidence of febrile illness,
a significant reduction in milk yield or increased mortality in
young stock to consult a veterinarian to rule out FMDV infection
(cf. Section 2a of the Ordinance on Protection against FMD1).
Similar rules for swine holdings have been in place since 1999. At
the same time, it must be made very clear to practitioners that the
exclusion testing option is not to be used if they actually suspect
FMD! If critical samples are submitted for exclusion testing only,
this can lead to delays in disease confirmation and containment
because they are not considered a high priority for delivery to and
processing at the diagnostic laboratory.
In the EU, while samples from suspect cases must always
be sent to the designated national reference laboratory (NRL),
exclusion testing by real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) can be done
in any laboratory designated by the competent authority (cf.
Annex XV No. 13 of the “FMD Directive”) (21). Suitable samples
for RT-qPCR tests are lesion material, if available, as well as
saliva and serum. In FMD-free countries, laboratories accepting
these samples do not need to operate under high-containment
conditions, but they are obliged to follow procedures that ensure
that the spread of possible FMDV present in the sample material
is effectively prevented (27). This includes, among other things,
the spatial and organizational separation of areas in which FMD
exclusion testing is carried out, the use of Class II microbiological
safety cabinets for the processing of samples that have not yet
been chemically or physically inactivated, and strict hygiene
management for work surfaces, equipment, laboratory waste, and
personal protective equipment. All laboratories that do exclusion
testing must operate to the highest diagnostic standards. In
addition to ISO accreditation, this should include successful
participation in FMD diagnostic proficiency tests periodically
administered by the NRL. The NRL should be kept informed of
any exclusion testing performed by these other laboratories.
1MKS-Verordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 18. Juli 2017 (BGBl.
I S. 2666, 3245, 3526).
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If the results of an exclusion test at another laboratory are not
clearly negative, the samples must be immediately forwarded to
the NRL for clarification (see Figure 2B). Under this scenario,
fresh sampling of the animals may be required to ensure the
provenance of samples and to eliminate any possibility of
accidental cross-contamination at the first laboratory. When
sending these samples, the transport regulations for category B
biological substances (UN3373) must be observed. At the same
time, the veterinary authority responsible for the holding where
the samples have been taken must be notified of the situation
and it is likely that the farm would be placed under formal
suspicion until results from the NRL are known. As long as the
first-line tests employed have high specificity, at this point, it
is no longer a question of exclusion testing or elimination of
differential diagnoses but may already rise to the level of a formal
suspicion of FMD. If a formal suspicion of FMD is declared,
testing to confirm or clear that suspicion can only be carried out
at the designated NRL (cf. Annex XV No. 5 and 13 of the “FMD
Directive”) where it will be treated with high priority.
Overall, when a non-discriminatory exclusion testing scheme
is implemented in a country, it is advisable for the veterinary
authorities to create guidelines for practitioners. This should
include a decision tree to determine whether or not a case is
likely to be FMD (based on the clinico-pathological presentation
and the epidemiological context), standard procedures for
sample collection and submission, and any follow-up actions
or reporting requirements. The veterinary authorities need to
devise a strategy for the ongoing training of practitioners to
make sure they know how to recognize FMD and the conditions
for applying non-discriminatory exclusion testing. Moreover, an
active communication channel from the veterinary authorities
to practitioners needs to be established to be able to timely
disseminate relevant information. For example, this can be used
to update stakeholders about the regional risk of FMD according
to its presence in neighboring countries, as this information will
influence the decision to consider FMD as a likely or unlikely
differential in a given case.
FMD EXCLUSION TESTING IN PRACTICE
Europe
Switzerland introduced non-discriminatory exclusion testing
in 2011. These examinations are carried out at two central
government laboratories and cover not only FMD but also
African swine fever (ASF), CSF, avian influenza (AI), and
Newcastle disease. Samples are submitted by veterinary
practitioners and pathologists and include mostly sera, lesions
or swabs; in addition, EDTA blood is requested to test for
bluetongue (BT) virus as a potential differential diagnosis. Since
the costs are covered by the government through the Federal
Food Safety and Veterinary Office, the exclusion examinations
are free of charge for the senders. The program is considered a
success both by the veterinary services and by practitioners, and
it has led to a marked increase in the number of samples tested
for foreign animal diseases (23). From January 2012 to February
2020, no “hot” suspicions were declared, but 101 FMD exclusion
tests were performed. Nevertheless, considering the number
of cattle, sheep, goats and pigs in Switzerland (1.5 million,
340 thousand, 80 thousand and 1.3 million, respectively), it
would be desirable to receive even more samples for exclusion
testing. In a large population of animals, there inevitably is some
“background noise” of oral lesions or lameness, due to endemic
infectious diseases such as contagious pustular dermatitis (orf)
or non-infectious causes such as chemical burns. For example,
a recent field study in sheep (28) found oral lesions in 1% of
animals. Even if most of these can be determined not to be FMD
by other means, a large number of cases will remain that warrant
laboratory diagnosis.
Belgium is using a risk-based “increased vigilance” scheme.
Among others, this increased vigilance is currently applied to
BT, ASF, and AI. The criteria that trigger exclusion diagnostics
in the absence of a clinical suspicion are very different for
each disease: for BT, it is importation of ruminants from risk
areas with serotypes other than serotype 8; for ASF, it is 2
or more pigs on a farm with symptoms of general disease;
for AI, it is abnormal production parameters (e.g., increased
mortality). Within the “increased vigilance” scheme, the costs for
sampling (or necropsy) are borne by the owner of the animals,
whereas laboratory analysis is paid for by the Federal Agency
for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC). As a result of the
aforementioned risk analysis, there currently is no organized
system for exclusion testing for FMD and other vesicular diseases,
even though these tests are available. Every decision for exclusion
testing for vesicular diseases is made on an ad-hoc basis. Reasons
for FMD exclusion testing can be. e.g., a herd problem of
unknown etiology, a (presumably false) positive result in an
antibody test for export certification, a lesion at the mouth or foot
observed at necropsy or irregularities with animal identification
or documentation of origin. In the latter case, the exclusion
testing must be paid for by the owner, otherwise it is paid for by
the FASFC since laboratory analysis is then done in the context of
a—perhaps not (yet) formally expressed—suspicion. On average,
there are ≤ 2 clinical suspicions and ≤10 exclusion diagnostics
for vesicular diseases per year in Belgium.
Austria introduced a non-discriminatory exclusion testing
scheme in 2014, which was revised in 20192. It consists of
five stages (see Table 2), whereby stage II (exclusion testing) is
divided into two sub-stages A and B. An earlier contingency plan
established in 2000 had only included provisions for suspected
holdings and holdings with an outbreak (29), similar to stages III,
and IV of the new scheme.
In routine cases (stage I), any diagnostic laboratory can test
for FMDV as a differential diagnosis, but all exclusion testing
(stage II), and investigations of FMD suspicions or outbreaks
take place at the Austrian NRL. Any veterinarian can submit
samples for FMD exclusion testing directly to the NRL or
can notify veterinary services. This notification is mandatory
if the veterinarian actually suspects FMD! Upon notification,
the official veterinarian visits the farm and determines the level
of suspicion. If there is only a weak indication of the disease,
samples will be submitted for exclusion testing (stage II.B) and
2Untersuchungen zum Zwecke des Ausschlusses von Tierseuchen. Erlass
BMASGK-74730/0002-IX/B/10/2019.
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TABLE 2 | Stages of the Austrian FMD testing scheme.
Stage I II A II B III IV
Type of investigation Differential diagnosis Exclusion testing Suspicion Outbreak
Respondent Any veterinarian Official veterinarian
Laboratory Any NRL NRL NRL NRL
Costs covered by ministry No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarantine of the farm No No No Yes Yes
TABLE 3 | FMD exclusion investigations done in Australia between 2017 and 2019 as reported in the Australian Animal Health Surveillance Quarterly (AHSQ).
Reported in AHSQ issue Cattle Sheep Camel Alpaca Goat Pig Buffalo FMD exclusion reports
2017–Vol 22/1 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
2017–Vol 22/2 9 6 0 0 0 1 0 p. 40
2017–Vol 22/3 8 5 0 0 0 2 0 p. 20, 33
2017–Vol 22/4 9 8 0 0 0 1 1 p. 18–19. 25
2018–Vol 23/1 10 5 0 0 0 3 0 p. 44
2018–Vol 23/2 20 6 1 0 2 0 0 p. 42
2018–Vol 23/3 10 3 0 0 0 1 0 p. 38
2018–Vol 23/4 9 2 0 0 0 2 0
2019–Vol 24/1 13 2 0 1 1 0 0 p. 20
2019–Vol 24/2 13 4 0 0 1 1 0 p. 19
2019–Vol 24/3 19 7 0 1 0 0 0 p. 17–18, 19
2019–Vol 24/4 13 4 1 0 0 0 0
Total (2017–2019) 141 54 2 2 4 11 1
no restrictions are imposed on the farm. If the suspicion of
FMD (or any other notifiable disease) is confirmed by the official
veterinarian, stage III (or IV, depending on severity) will be
declared and the holding will be quarantined.
Exclusion testing in Austria is free of charge for the farmer,
since the central competent authority covers the costs of the
testing. However, if the farmer wants a test for a non-notifiable
disease from the same sample material (in addition to the
exclusion testing), they have to cover the costs of this additional
testing. Although non-discriminatory exclusion testing has been
offered in Austria since 2014, not many samples have been
submitted to the NRL. There are< 5 cases of exclusion testing for
vesicular diseases per year in Austria, for a susceptible population
of 1.9 million cattle, 0.5 million sheep, 0.1 million goats, and 3
million pigs.
In Germany, the regional veterinary diagnostic laboratories
of all federal states (with the exception of the city states, which
only have negligible numbers of livestock), have offered exclusion
testing for FMD since 2014, following the earlier implementation
of distributed non-discriminatory testing for CSF, AI, and ASF.
Private laboratories do not test for FMDV. The participating
regional laboratories are enrolled in proficiency tests conducted
by the NRLs (30, 31) and will forward positive or inconclusive
samples to the NRL for confirmation. Due to the sovereignty of
the individual states in matters of animal health, the terms and
conditions under which the program is conducted are variable, as
is the acceptance among practitioners and the number of samples
submitted (32). From 2014 to 2016, the number of samples
tested for FMDV RNA across all laboratories increased from
281 to 729 (32) without the concurrent emergence of another
vesicular disease such as Senecavirus A (SVA) infection (33), as
has happened in the United States (see below). This shows that
the concept of FMD exclusion testing is gaining acceptance. But,
similar to the situation in Switzerland, the number of tests is still
far too low compared to the population of susceptible animals
in Germany (2016: 12.3 million heads of cattle, 2 million small
ruminants and 28 million pigs), and has to be further increased.
Australia
Similar to the situation in Germany, each of the states and
territories that make up the Australian federation operate under
different animal health legislation and the Chief Veterinary
Officer (CVO) of the relevant state determines if any legal
restrictions should apply. Legally binding on-farm restrictions
are notmandated whenever an FMD laboratory test is conducted.
This allows for exclusion testing to be carried out where
FMD is not thought to be a probable differential diagnosis
however clinical signs such as lameness or salivation are
present. This approach applies across all nationally notifiable
diseases and aims to encourage exclusion testing for all livestock
species. In the 3 years between January 2017 and December
2019, 215 exclusions for vesicular diseases were carried out
in Australia (Table 3). All exclusion testing for nationally
notifiable livestock diseases is funded by the commonwealth
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government and testing is carried out by the Australian Center
for Disease Preparedness in Geelong. Detailed case reports on
FMD exclusions are frequently published in the Australian
Animal Health Surveillance Quarterly (34) (see examples
in Table 3).
In addition to the laboratory testing being funded by the
national government, Australia also has in place a National
Significant Disease Investigation Program (SDI) (35). This
program provides subsidized veterinary services and diagnostic
testing up to the value of AU$1100 to investigate disease
events (36). This program aims to encourage non-government
veterinarians to investigate the cause of a significant disease event
even when the commercial value of the animal is less than the
veterinary services required. Although not specifically targeted at
vesicular diseases, the SDI program often results in government
and non-government veterinarians working together to solve
animal health problems.




The UK has adopted a binary perspective for initial report
cases of FMD in the country—i.e., either (i) there is credible
suspicion of disease and on-farm restrictions are adopted
until laboratory results are generated or evidence for disease
freedom can be provided from other sources, or (ii) based on
the clinical and epidemiological context, the animals are not
considered to be infected with FMDV and no laboratory testing
is necessary or even desirable. This is achieved by a two-tiered
alert system (available 24 h a day with veterinary epidemiology
support): in stage 1, where restrictions are immediately placed
on the premises (by law), clinical suspicion of FMD leads
to a visit of an official veterinarian, who undertakes clinical
investigation and assesses whether samples are to be taken.
If the veterinary visit cannot rule out FMD, stage 2 involves
sample collection, laboratory testing and implementation of full
restrictions on the farm as well as the need for area restrictions
(considered by the competent authority) until a negative test
result is returned.
Similar to the UK, France does not employ non-
discriminatory exclusion testing for FMD, but its national
reference laboratory also has veterinarians and epidemiologists
available by phone 24 h a day. Veterinary practitioners who
encounter alarming clinical signs can call in and describe and
electronically transmit their observations with photos. Taking
into account the risk profile of the holding, the epidemiological
situation and the clinical signs, the central team will decide if
the situation requires laboratory testing or if FMD can be ruled
out without it. This relieves the veterinary practitioner of any
responsibility for that decision and lowers the bar for reporting
possibly suspect cases. If testing is deemed necessary (usually
1–2 cases per year for a susceptible population of 20 million
cattle, 9 million sheep and 7 million pigs), the holding will be
quarantined, and the samples will be forwarded to the NRL with
high priority and tested immediately at any time.
Italy does not offer exclusion testing for FMD. In case of an
FMD suspicion, private veterinarians must inform the veterinary
services, which will then visit the suspected herd. The cost of
laboratory testing for suspect cases is covered by national funds
from the Ministry of Health. Formal FMD suspicions were last
declared in 2015 and 2016 (2 each), for a susceptible population
of 5.6 million cattle, 0.4 million buffalo, 6.2 million sheep, 1
million goats and 8.7 million pigs. Currently, virological testing
for FMD in Italy is only done at the NRL, which is located at
one of the ten Istituti zooprofilattici sperimentali (IZS) of the
national animal health and food safety network. However, the IZS
network is prepared to carry out post-vaccination FMD serology,
and it is planned to extend the existing proficiency testing for the
serological assays to include FMDV RT-qPCR. This will build up
distributed diagnostic capability that will be very useful if there is
an FMD outbreak. If low-risk submissions (e.g., from holdings
without clinical signs) can be tested at regional laboratories,
this frees up testing capacity for critical samples at the NRL
during an outbreak and can decrease sample turnaround time in
large countries.
North America
In Canada, based on the experience of the 1951 outbreak (18),
all suspicions of vesicular disease in Canada are considered to
be FMD until proven otherwise and any suspicion must be
reported to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (37).
Following that notification, the local CFIA veterinarian visits
the premises. Based on the clinical signs and in consultation
with CFIA foreign animal disease specialists, the level of risk
is determined, commensurate restrictions are placed on the
premises and samples are collected for laboratory testing at
the National Center for Foreign Animal Disease. Samples from
animals with clinical signs, morbidity, epidemiological data
or other factors that indicate a high likelihood of FMD are
submitted as “high risk.” For cases where the risk of FMD is low
but still warrants laboratory testing, the samples are submitted
as “confirmatory negative.” Even when the risk is negligible,
samples can be sent for laboratory testing under the category of
“disease investigation.”
In the United States, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the competent
authority for the detection of a foreign/transboundary animal
disease (FAD/TAD). Samples for suspect vesicular diseases
in livestock are sent to an approved laboratory within the
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), a
network of more than 60 state, university-associated, and
federal laboratories across the country that provide both active
and passive surveillance, as well as surge capacity support
during an outbreak (38). Duplicate samples are also sent to
the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) Foreign
Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) on Plum Island
for confirmatory testing to rule out FMD, as handling live FMDV
is currently prohibited on the U.S. mainland3. All suspect FAD
3United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 4, Title 21, Chapter 4, Subchapter
III – Prevention of Introduction and Spread of Contagion, Sec. 113a –
Establishment of research laboratories for foot-and-mouth disease and other
animal diseases. Pub. L.116-141; 2020-06-03.
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investigations (FADIs) require formal notification within the
National Response Framework. All FADIs begin with notification
to the state animal health official (SAHO) and the federal Area
Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), at which time a veterinarian
trained in FAD sample collection by FADDL, known as a Foreign
Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD), is dispatched to the
location. The FADD collects duplicate samples to send to NVSL
and a NAHLN laboratory proficiency tested to run the same
FMDV PCR assays as FADDL.
Testing results and reporting will be expedited based on
the assigned priority level. The FADD, SAHO, and AVIC
will agree on a priority level based on risk and on-site
epidemiology of the suspect vesicular case. Four priority levels
exist: (i) Priority 3, low suspicion for/unlikely to be an FAD,
but cannot be distinguished from an endemic condition.
(ii) Priority 2, indication this is possibly an FAD, and
cannot be distinguished from an endemic condition. Rapid
laboratory confirmation is required; (iii) Priority 1, prompt
laboratory confirmation is required because there is a high
suspicion for an FAD; and finally (iv) Priority A, which
also requires prompt laboratory confirmation and is used
in situations where animals in commerce are held pending
results for FAD testing (39). Testing is conducted at no cost to
the customer.
In some situations, testing for endemic diseases that are
clinically indistinguishable from FMD, such as SVA infection
(33), may also be performed by NVSL FADDL or the NAHLN.
The recent emergence of SVA in North America has led to a
dramatic increase in costly official disease notifications in Canada
and the USA (40). Prior to 2016, FADDL saw an average of 150
FADIs annually, but in 2017, more than 1,300 accessions were
received. Through a shared testing program, 343 of 1,314 total
cases in 2018 were tested by the NAHLN only and not by FADDL.
In 2019, ∼1,542 accessions were received; however, 687 of those
were tested only at a NAHLN laboratory.
In Mexico, a specific surveillance program for vesicular
diseases of animals—the binational Mexico-United States
Commission for the Prevention of FMD and Other Exotic
Diseases of Animals (CPA)—has been in place since 1954. Any
suspect vesicular disease must be immediately reported. There
is an entire program dedicated to promoting such notifications
through courses, newsletters, and social networks. All suspect
cases are attended to in < 24 h, on any day of the year, and are
handled exclusively by CPA personnel, who have the necessary
equipment and means to respond to any notification of a suspect
foreign animal disease. Diagnosis occurs at a single high-security
laboratory and all investigations are paid for by the CPA. In 2019,
2,621 samples from 103 cases were tested for FMDV, 702/41 of
which were cattle, 1,029/35 goats, 685/20 sheep, 85/4 swine, and
120/3 wildlife.
South America
In South America, the epidemiological context and the risk
perception is different than in Europe and North America. After
its introduction to South America in the 19th century, FMD
quickly became endemic in the large cattle population. Only
through a tremendous and sustained collaborative effort over
several decades has the continent now come close to eradication
of the disease (41). While all of South America, apart from
Venezuela and a small zone in north-eastern Colombia, is
recognized as FMD-free (with or without vaccination) by the
OIE (42), the fear of this disease and its economic consequences
is still very present among the governments and producers in
the region. Thus, there is a strong pressure to deal with any
suspicion of vesicular disease as if it were FMD.Notably, vesicular
stomatitis virus (VSV) is present in the region, particularly
in Colombia and Ecuador (43–45). It has a pathological
presentation in ruminants and pigs that is indistinguishable
from FMD and laboratory testing is required to rule it out.
Accordingly, in the presence of suspected vesicular disease, FMD
should always be ruled out together with VSV and for swine, it is
advisable to include SVA as well.
An informal opinion poll of current and former CVOs and
NRL directors in South America conducted for this review
revealed strong disapproval of making non-discriminatory
exclusion testing available as an option for private veterinarians.
It was seen as too difficult to define what constitutes “clear”
or “less clear” suspicions of FMD, and even more difficult to
explain such a difference to farmers and private veterinarians.
There also was concern that exclusion testing may allow farmers
or practitioners to intentionally delay the notification of exotic
animal diseases, ultimately resulting in a failure to implement
appropriate control measures in a timely manner. In addition,
an epidemiological investigation by the veterinary services is
seen as essential for vesicular disease suspicions because negative
laboratory results may be obtained from infected herds due to
inappropriate sample collection, handling or analysis.
In 2018, the 13 countries that are part of the South
American Commission for the Fight Against FMD (COSALFA)
reviewed the way FMD suspicions are addressed (45). It
was agreed that any suspicion of vesicular disease needs to
be responded to by the official veterinary services which
should proceed, in the first place, with an official visit to the
farm. On site, the official veterinarian will decide, based on
the epidemiological investigation and the clinico-pathological
presentation, whether it is a so-called “well-founded suspicion.”
Well-founded suspicions should always lead to laboratory testing
at the NRL and until FMD is ruled out, the farm is quarantined,
and movement restrictions are applied. On the contrary, if the
official veterinarian rules out FMD during the site visit the case
may be closed without laboratory testing, similar to the approach
taken by the UK and France.
There are, however, exceptions to this procedure. For example,
when vesicular lesions are found in pigs at an abattoir in Brazil,
slaughter may proceed normally if the batch is accompanied by
official documentation from the veterinary services indicating
that the farm of origin has been investigated for FMD with a
negative result within the last 30 days (46). This is used by
commercial pig farms with high biosecurity standards that are
located in recognized FMD-free areas where SVA is known to
be present.
In 2018, the last year for which collated data are available
from the Pan American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Center
(PANAFTOSA) (43), a total of 1,976 suspicions of vesicular
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TABLE 4 | Vesicular disease notifications, laboratory diagnoses, and number of cattle and buffalo in South America in 2018.
Positive diagnosis* Negative laboratory diagnosis Number of cattle and buffalo
Country Notifications of “Well-founded” FMDV VSV SVA FMDV VSV SVA Headsb Farmsc
vesicular diseasea
Argentina 5 0 – – – 5 – – 55,546,342 205,655
Bolivia 23 0 – – – 23 – – 9,092,286 183,702
Brazil 775 334 – 4 21 775 771 602 218,004,131 2,454,550
Chile 15 15 – – – 15 15 – 3,719,507 125,402
Colombia 428 428 7 (1) 241 18 161 – – 27,590,935 627,239
Ecuador 575 575 – 308 (5) – 570 114 – 4,313,264 271,590
Guyana 23 0 – – – – – – 260,673 4,024
Panama 24 0 – 8 (16) – 16 2 – 1,521,500 43,948
Paraguay 10 10 – – – 10 10 – 13,500,965 145,025
Peru 45 45 – 36 (32) – 45 13 – 5,156,044 881,920
Uruguay 10 0 – – – 10 – – 11,435,655 40,576
Venezuela 43 43 – 9 (11) – 2 2 – 15,454,847 108,211
aA farm with one or more susceptible animals with pertinent clinical signs. bMore than 95% of these are cattle. cMore than 98% of farms have only cattle. *Either by laboratory testing
or by clinico-epidemiological investigation (numbers in parentheses).
disease were reported in 12 countries, together representing over
365million heads of cattle and buffalo. In only 7 cases was FMDV
infection confirmed by laboratory diagnosis (see Table 4).
Argentina
Like other South American countries, Argentina does not
offer exclusion testing. It is free of FMD without vaccination
in Patagonia, the southern region of the country, and with
vaccination in the rest of the country, where only cattle are
vaccinated. The susceptible population includes 55 million cattle,
12 million sheep, 4 million goats, and 5 million pigs. The
last FMD outbreak occurred in April 2006. Notification of the
disease, including suspicious cases, is mandatory. In the event of
a FMD incident, or even when it is only a suspicion, farmers and
private veterinarians must immediately make a formal report to
the local veterinary services. The latter are solely responsible for
collecting and sending the samples to the NRL, which is the only
laboratory authorized and accredited to perform the diagnostic
tests with the appropriate biosafety and issue the final diagnosis.
The costs are entirely covered by the national veterinary services.
Although private veterinarians or farmers should not collect
and send samples of suspect cases, their participation and
contribution to FMD surveillance is very significant. In fact, they
receive training from the national veterinary services to recognize
an FMD suspicion. Furthermore, farmers are associated to a
local animal health association supervised by the National Food
Safety and Quality Service SENASA. This association performs
activities such as animal surveys, vaccinations, and surveillance.
Apart from the concerns listed above, it is important to mention
that the countries importing meat from Argentina (including the
EU, USA, and China) regularly review the records of all suspect
cases of FMD and would probably not accept an exclusion testing
scheme instead of the current system.
DISCUSSION
Non-discriminatory FMD exclusion testing can help to quickly
detect an introduction of this devastating disease into a
previously free area, which is essential for its effective control.
In countries where they are available, exclusion testing schemes
are gaining acceptance among veterinary practitioners, but
more needs to be done to promote the programs and increase
awareness about foreign animal diseases in general.
At the same time, the possible pitfalls of exclusion testing
should be kept in mind. Concerns about delays in the
implementation of control measures are a major reason that
many countries do not allow practitioners to submit samples
for FMD exclusion. In these countries, any suspicion of FMD
must be handled by the veterinary authorities, who will then
take measures (quarantines, laboratory testing etc.) based on a
risk analysis. The response to suspicions of FMD or other exotic
animal diseases is often seen as an inalienable state activity to
be carried out by the national animal health service, leading to
strong resistance to the concept of non-discriminatory exclusion
testing in the hands of private practitioners and laboratories other
than the central NRL.
In this context it is important to emphasize that exclusion
testing may complement, but cannot replace formally declared
suspicions! A lot of the disagreement about non-discriminatory
exclusion testing comes from the fact that in many countries,
as soon as FMD is even considered in the differential diagnosis
of a clinical case, it must be reported to the authorities. By
contrast, other countries only require the notification of an
actual suspicion. Where the lines between “no suspicion,” “weak
suspicion” (consideration as a differential diagnosis) and “well-
founded suspicion” are to be drawn is critical but often left to the
individual private practitioner or government official.
It is clear, however, that a key step for the success of
non-discriminatory FMD exclusion testing is the decision
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made by the private veterinarian during the farm visit; i.e.,
whether they consider FMD likely, unlikely or even rule it out
completely (as depicted in Figure 2B). Therefore, any country
considering the implementation of an exclusion testing scheme
should establish guidelines to align the criteria of the private
veterinarians with the officially desired benchmark. If the clinical
and epidemiological picture clearly warrants directly raising a
suspicion with the veterinary authorities, this must be done
immediately in order to quarantine the infected farm and ensure
prompt laboratory diagnosis.
Where decentralized FMD testing is available, it is critical
that all laboratories involved operate to the highest diagnostic
standards, particularly when negative results obtained in a
regional laboratory are not sent to the NRL for confirmation.
Moreover, the official veterinary system should be aware in
real time of any ongoing non-discriminatory exclusion testing
to keep records and to be alert in case a positive result
appears. In addition to high sensitivity, diagnostic pipelines
used for exclusion testing must have very high specificity to
avoid false-positive results. False-negative results can obviously
be catastrophic, but also the potential for false positives
reduces the enthusiasm of farmers, veterinarians and government
officials to endorse exclusion testing schemes. Due to the
infrequent nature of FMD incursions into free countries and
the multiplicity of factors that can affect FMD recognition, it
is difficult to obtain empirical evidence for the effectiveness of
any particular detection measure, including the relatively new
exclusion testing schemes.
Either way, in order to maintain the freedom from FMD in
any country, active and informed participation at all levels—
professional farmers and hobbyists, practitioners, educators and
veterinary services—is essential. The longer a disease has not
occurred in a country, the more important it is to make sure
that all stakeholders are aware of the risk of reintroduction,
are well-equipped to identify its clinical signs and know what
steps to take should the occasion arise. Online resources (such
as webinars or phone apps with visual references) can be
of great utility in the implementation of non-discriminatory
exclusion testing schemes. In addition, farmers and practitioners
must have confidence in the official animal health authorities,
and must be assured that any notification is immediately
responded to, a quick diagnosis is obtained, and preventive
regulatory measures are applied for as short as possible.
Non-discriminatory exclusion testing is one of a range of
measures that can be considered to improve the detection of
FMD incursions.
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